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Rent Strikes and the Law: 
The Limitations of the 
Ann Arbor Experience 
by Myron Moskovitz 
The experience of the Ann Arbor 
rent strikers, as revealed by the 
preceding article, should be noted with 
interest by tenant union organizers 
throughout the country. These tactical 
uses of the law can stimulate local 
organizers to think of new ways to use 
the law to further their efforts in their 
own communities. 
It is important to examine, 
however, factors peculiar to the Ann 
Arbor situation that tend to make 
those tactics less universally applicable 
than might be expected. These 
peculiarities should be especially 
important to organizers of low-income 
tenant organizations in slum neighbor-
hoods. 
First, the Ann Arbor rent strikers 
were mostly middle-class college 
students. This accounts for one of the 
strongest weapons of the ·strikers, their 
masses. 
Because 1,200 tenants joined the 
strike, the Tenants Union was able to 
jam court dockets so that a very small 
proportion of eviction cases could 
come to trial. It was able to withhold 
an enormous amount of rent 
($140,000) and hold this money in an 
escrow account for which landlords 
might be willing to negotiate. Finally, 
because of its numbers, the Tenants 
Union was able to obtain political 
support from some influential 
organizations and individuals. 
Organizers of low-income tenant 
unions are not likely to be able to 
assemble this many participants in a 
single strike. Students are usually 
fairly resilient young people, without 
dependents. If a student is evicted, he 
can usually "crash" for a few nights or 
even a few weeks at a friend's home. A 
low-income family with four or five 
children, however, lacks this mobility. 
Also, students tend to be politically 
aware of the need for organizing large 
numbers of people in order to combat 
certain well-entrenched interests. 
Low-income people have not had the 
experience or the exposure that brings 
about this consciousness of the larger 
picture. This factor affects the number 
of organizers that can be recruited as 
well as the willingness of potential 
strikers to be organized. 
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Since organizing large numbers of 
people takes many man-hours, the 
number of organizers and the amount 
of time they can give is important. 
While local situations vary, students 
generally tend to have more time 
available than low-income people, who 
must work and raise families. Finally, 
organizers of low-income people must 
usually overcome a general fear among 
low-income people of taking any 
action that might upset the status quo 
and make their situation even worse. 
This is particularly true when that 
action involves challenging established 
authority, whether it be the welfare 
department, the police, or the 
landlord. Middle-class students are not 
so likely to be afraid. 
Second, the strikers were blessed 
with the benefits of some of the best 
landlord-tenant legislation in the 
country. 1 Recent Michigan statutes 
provide that the landlord impliedly 
covenants that the premises are fit and 
that he will keep them in reasonable 
repair,2 and that his substantial 
breach of these covenants is a defense 
to an eviction action for nonpayment 
of rent.3 No other state has legislation 
that appears to give tenants such a 
powerful weapon. A Michigan 
landlord may not retaliate against a 
tenant by evicting him because he has 
reported housing code violations to a 
government agency or "for any other 
lawful act arising out of the tenancy."4 
While a few states have retaliatory 
eviction statutes protecting the report 
of code violations,5 only one other 
state6 goes as far as Michigan in 
protecting other actions also. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, even if 
a Michigan tenant loses an unlawful 
detainer action, he cannot be evicted if 
he pays the rent due plus costs within 
ten days. 7 This crucial provision, 
found in few other states,8 permits 
tenants to go on strike and test their 
defenses in court with the confidence 
that they cannot be evicted, so long as 
they save their rent money and a few 
extra dollars for potential costs. 
Armed with this legislation, a 
tenant union organizer in Michigan can 
assure prospective strikers that they 
may have good defenses in an eviction 
action, that the landlord cannot make 
reprisals against them for certain 
actions and that, even if they lose the 
eviction suit, they cannot be evicted 
(if they pay the rent due plus costs). 
Organizers in other states cannot give 
these assurances. Because of this, other 
tactics must be used to supplement the 
rent strike as a means of putting 
pressure on landlords. Affirmative 
suits, picketing, publicity and even 
physically resisting evictions will play 
a more important role. 
These tactics and the various 
factors to take into account when 
organizing low-income tenants are 
more throughly discussed in the 
Appendix to this article, which 
consists of excerpts from the Tenant 
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I. However, not every tenant organizer in Michigan is completely 
satisfied with the new legislation. See Glotta,Tenant's Attorney: 
Evaluation of lnpact, 2 Prospectus 247 (December, 1968). 
2. Mich. Comp. Laws §554.139 (1) (1969 supp.). 
3. Mich. Comp. Laws §600.5637 (5) (b) (1969 Supp.). 
4. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5646 (4). 
5. See 111. Rev. Stats., Chapt. 80 § 71; New Jersey Stats. Ann., 
§ 2A: 170-92-1 (1969 Supp.); Gen. Laws of Mass., Chapt. 186, § 18 
and Chapt. 239, § 2A. 
6. Gen. Laws of Rhode Island, § 34-20-1 o. 
7. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5673. 
8. See, e.g., Penn. Stats. Ann., Title 68, § 250.504; New Jersey 
Stats. Ann., § 2A.: 18-55; Vermont Stats. Ann., Title 12, § 4773; New 
:Yor.k Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law§ 751 (see also 
Albany v. White, 46 Misc. 2nd 915, 261 N.Y.S. 2d 361 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 
1965). 
9. Prepared and reprinted with the permission of the National 
Housing and Development Law Project, Earl Warren Legal 
Institute, Berkeley, California. The Tenant Union Guide has 
been prepared especially for use by Legal Services attorneys. 
Further information is avaiiable from them upon request. 
Footnotes in the Appendix have been renumbered. 
Appendix 
Tenant Union Guide 
Legal Services Attornies 
The Tenant Union Guide has been 
prepared by the National Housing and 
Development Law Project, especially 
for use by Legal Services attorneys. 
The Guide discusses the following 
topics: 1) the role of the Legal 
Services attorney vis-a-vis tenants' 
groups, 2) the chances of success of a 
tenants' union, 3) obtaining the 
required factual information, 4) 
tactical and legal considerations in 
putting pressure on landlords, 5) 
conducting negotiations, 6) the 
structure of a collective bargaining 
agreement, and 7) further opportuni-
ties for the tenant union. The 
following exerpts are reprinted with 
the permission of the National 
Housing and Development Law 
Project, Earl Warren Legal Institute, 
Berkeley, California 94720. Additional 
information is available from them 
upon request. 
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Part I. An Overview 
A. The Problem 
Legal Severices attorneys represent-
ing low-income tenants are becoming 
increasingly frustrated. Since they 
began working in neighborhood 
offices, they have seen landlords 
charging too much rent for inadequate 
dwellings which landlords refuse to 
maintain properly. They have seen 
landlords mistreating tenants in 
various ways. Landlords refuse to 
return security deposits and often 
enter tenants' apartments without 
permission. 
These attorneys have spent much 
time and effort attacking such 
problems. They have filed lawsuits, 
defended eviction cases, and reported 
violations of housing codes to health 
and building inspectors. The results 
have been minimal. A few landlords 
who were sued often enough may have 
improved their practices somewhat, 
but no dent has been made in the basic 
situation. 
The reason for this is becoming 
clear. These attorneys have been 
attacking symptoms, not causes. When 
one stands back a few feet and looks 
at the situation for a moment, the 
causes become apparent. 
First, in most cities, the demand for 
housing for low-income tenant~ far 
exceeds the supply. While inner-city 
populations are increasing from 
internal population growth and 
in-migration almost no new housing is 
being constructed there. In fact, urban 
renewal programs have been 
destroying much of this housing, 
without replacing it with new 
low-income housing. Nor is new 
housing for low-income people being 
produced outside of the slums, for 
poor people, especially blacks, are not 
wanted in middle-class neighborhoods. 
Once this is realized, the implications 
become obvious. First, we have a 
sellers' market. Where this is so, no 
logical, humane, or legal arguments 
can overcome the fact that the seller 
(the landlord) has all the marbles. If 
the poor tenant does not like the way 
he is treated, he can easily be replaced 
at the same rent. Second, the limited 
supply stems from the fact that the 
real "enemy" of the low-income 
tenant is not just the slumlord he and 
the Legal Services attorney can see, 
but also the people outside the slum 
who refuse to allow low-income 
housing to be built in their communi-
ties so that supply might come up to 
demand. This includes city councilmen 
and housing authority officials of 
surrounding surburban communities as 
well as Congressmen who refuse to 
appropriate adequate funds for 
construction of low-income housing. 
The second cause, directly related 
to the first, is that the landlords and 
other "enemies" have substantial 
political influence while low-income 
tenants have essentially none. Health 
and building inspection departments 
are under-staffed, and the staff they 
do have are often unsympathetic to 
tenants and even, in some cases, 
corrupt. District attorneys refuse to 
prosecute housing code cases 
vigorously. Local public housing 
authorities refuse to build new units. 
22 
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Landlord-tenant legislation in most 
states is heavily oriented in favor of 
the landlord. Why? Because the 
elected officials who appoint these 
people and enact these laws feel little 
or no real political pressure to respond 
to the needs of low-income tenants. 
When these causes are recognized, 
the cure becomes clear. While 
middle-class liberal groups may be 
helpful allies in pressing for recogni-
tion of the rights of low-income 
tenants, the influence of these groups 
is limited and any significant economic 
and political influence must come 
from low-income tenants themselves. 
Some device must be found to 
organize low-income tenants into 
effective groups whose voices and 
votes will be heard by landlords, 
elected officials, and other people 
whose decisions affect the nature of 
the tenants' environment. 
The device which will be discussed 
in this memorandum is the tenant 
union. 
B. The Tenant Union 
A tenant union is analogous to a 
labor union. Workers suffered from an 
extremely poor bargaining position, 
lack of political influence, ineffective 
legal protection, and consequent low 
wages and poor working conditions. 
Today most workers have organized 
into unions which use the collective 
power o'f the workers to deal with 
employers from a position of strength 
and to exert substantial influence on 
local and national political bodies. The 
effect this has had on improving wages 
and working conditions is self-evident. 
Hopefully, tenant unions can 
someday attain a similar position. We 
are certainly a long way from this 
degree of success, but the time is right 
for a push in this direction. The civil 
rights movement of the early l 960's 
and the federally sponsored poverty 
program (through its failures as well as 
its successes) have generated in the 
poor a feeling for the need for 
organization and collective action. The 
beginnfo.gs of tenant unions are now 
springing up in several large cities 
throughout the country. A National 
Conference on Tenants' Rights was 
held in January of 1969 in Chicago 
and brought together for the first time 
representatives of tenant groups from 
around the country, and recently a 
Nationwide Tenants' Rights Program 
was set up by the American Friends 
Service Committee. 1 
Before exploring some of the larger 
political and economic impacts that 
tenant unions might eventually be able 
to make, let us examine what a group 
of tenants can do to improve 
conditions in their own building if 
they act collectively. First, they can 
force the landlord to meet their 
"non-money" demands. These involve 
arbitrary fines, and evictions without 
cause. Second, tenant groups can raise 
or capture capital to be used for 
improving the building or lowering the 
rents. This can be done by helping the 
landlord raise outside loan money at 
low interest and, where the landlord's 
profits are ''excessive, ' capturing some 
of that profit money. Third, tenant 
unions can improve morale of the 
tenants by permitting them to become 
more involved in decisions affecting 
their environment. This will reduce 
expenses due to vandalism and lack of 
care for the property. By lowering 
these costs, more money is available to 
be captured for improvements or rent 
reductions. 
At this point, it is essential that we 
emphasize that the tenant union 
approach is very difficult. It requires 
the patience of a saint and a certain 
measure of masochism, for the 
likelihood of failure in an individual 
situation is very high. Although tenant 
organization in any form has been 
rare, in those instances where it has 
happened the accomplishments have 
almost invariably been minimal. 
Tenants get upset about a particular 
problem, such as the landlord's failure 
to provide heat or to get rid of rats. 
They get together, stage a rent strike 
or set up a picket line at the landlord's 
home, and, in some cases, they will 
"win". What they "win" is the 
landlord's agreement to accede to that 
particular demand. The tenants do not 
ask for the right to deal with the 
landlord collectively on various 
matters on a regular basis, and 
therefore they do not get it. The boiler 
is fixed or the rats are poisoned and 
everybody goes home. When 
something else goes wrong, or when 
the boiler breaks down again next 
year, the landlord behaves as he always 
did. Even where the tenants' group 
does have the foresight to demand a 
collective bargainging agreement-
recognizing the group as the bargaining 
agent for tenants and granting tenants 
specific rights-the group usually fades 
away after this "victory" and the 
collective bargaining agreement is 
never really enforced. 
What almost never happens is for 
the group to "subdue" the landlord 
while at the same time institutional-
izing its gains and sustaining itself as a 
permanent organization to see that the 
gains are made as permanent as 
possible. Granted, something is gained 
even where groups spring up, obtain 
some specific gains and fade away. 
New leaders are trained and brought to 
the surface and the people begin to 
acquire a feeling for organization and 
what it can accomplish. But this in not 
enough and we should not be satisfied 
with it. 
There are many reasons why these 
groups fail. There are many hurd1es 
along the way, any one of which can 
trip them up and end the matter. 
These hurdles will be discussed in this 
memorandum in the hope that they 
can be handled. One of the major 
reasons for failure, however, is that 
everything is done on an ad hoc basis. 
There is no planning. Organizers may 
"select" the wrong leaders, the wrong 
tenants, or the wrong building, in 
effect starting with a situation where 
any significant success is next to 
impossible. Or, while the selection may 
be well-founded, there is no general 
vision of what the ultimate goals of 
the group are, and therefore the 
organizing proceeds in a way which 
makes it very unlikely that a lasting 
organization can emerge. 
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D. Need for a larger 
Organization 
As it was indicated earlier, the 
problems facing the low-income tenant 
go way beyond those solvable by 
fighting the slum landlord. City and 
suburban politicians and state and 
federal officials lie at the heart of 
many of their problems. It is hard to 
imagine a group of tenants from one 
slum building attacking these centers 
of power in any significant way. They 
must begin their struggle against their 
landlord because he is the most 
immediate and visible source of their 
problems. A poor tenant cannot be 
organized to battle Congress, but he 
will challenge his landlord. Eventually, 
however, after "defeating" landlords 
and discovering how limited their 
accomplishments have been, groups of 
tenants will come to a level of 
sophistication where they can 
understand that they must take on 
some of these larger interests. This is 
beginning to happen in some cities, 
where tenant organizations with a 
good deal of experience have to begin 
to challenge urban renewal programs 
which do not provide for adequate 
relocation, public housing authorities 
which refuse to build new units on a 
non-segregated basis, and FHA offices 
which refuse to make loans to groups 
of low-income people for rehabilita-
tion. 
To reach this point, the tenant 
union must evolve into a larger 
organization, one which can bring 
together more poor people in the 
community who are interested in the 
many problems affecting them, police, 
schools, and employment matters as 
well as housing. This larger organiza-
tion can bring pressure to bear on 
these larger problems, while at the 
same time, assisting smaller groups in 
the community to form and to grow. 
It has been found that even 
organization of tenants in individual 
buildings is very difficult without 
some neighborhood-wide or city-wide 
support group assisting the tenants. 
Where this does not exist, serious 
problems are bound to arise. Tenants 
do not gain the benefit of the 
experience from past mistakes that 
others can offer. They do not get the 
moral support which is often essential 
to overcome their fears. Technical 
assistance and advice on legal, financial 
and other matters requiring profes-
sional expertise is harder to come by. 
Also, even if they get a collective 
bargai'ning agreement from the 
landlord, it is seldom enforced and the 
tenant union fades out of existence 
fairly quickly. This is partly because of 
normal tenant turnover, which means 
that "involved" tenants leave and are 
replaced by new tenants who did not 
take part in the struggle and have no 
sense of commitment to the tenants 
union or to the fulfillment of the 
provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
A neighborhood-wide or city-wide 
organization can help overcome these 
problems. It can furnish moral and 
technical back-up. It can lend its 
broader influence and access to the 
press, city officials, and money to 
assist the tenant union, where 
appropriate. Most important, it has the 
continuity and stability necessary to 
assure that the fruits of victory are 
realized, i.e., that normal tenant 
turnover does not remove the 
watchdog needed to see that the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement 
are obeyed. 
Perhaps more importantly, the 
wider organization can furnish a 
vehicle for the tenant union and its 
members to become involved in 
exerting their newly established 
influence; collectively with other 
groups in the community, in matters 
going beyond its problems with the 
landlord. This includes not only 
housing, but schools, employment, 
consumer and police problems as well. 
Part III 
At the Threshold of Organizing-
Selecting Where to Become 
Involved 
A. Introduction 
As mentioned in Part I, organiza-
tion must be done.on a selective basis. 
Certain factors, to be discussed in this 
part, influence the degree of possible 
tenant union success so heavily that to 
ignore them would be to increase the 
likelihood of failure enormously, cause 
a wasted investment of time and 
resources, and raise illusory hopes in 
the people. These factors should be 
analyzed and understood before any 
major decisions are made. Even where, 
for some reason, you decide to 
become involved while knowing that 
the realistic goals are limited, you 
should understand these limitations 
beforehand so you can act accord· 
ingly. 
The main factors to be considered 
are the condition of the building, the 
nature of the landlord, including both 
his economic position and his 
personality, and the types of tenants 
living in the building. 
B. Condition of the Building 
Three rough classifications of 
buildings by condition may be made. 
1. Standard Buildings 
"Standard" buildings are those with 
few or no housing code violations. 
They are in some instances occupied 
by poor or lower-middle income 
tenants. The apartments may be small 
and tacky, but they are "legally" 
sound. The tenants may still be 
discontented, however, particularly 
over the rent level or new exorbitant 
rent increases, so the need for 
organization may be present in these 
buildings. Also, they might be upset 
over certain policies of the landlord, 
such as unannounced inspections or 
restrictions on decorating, planting 
gardens, or having pets. 
The problem with organizing 
tenants in standard buildings is that the 
lack of housing code violations 
removes one of the important props 
from one of the most effective tactics 
which may be used against the 
landlord . . . . Often the only possible 
24 
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defense to eviction suits brought 
because of a rent strike is the presence 
of substantial code violations 
(although this principle itself is not yet 
well established). Where tenants in a 
standard building stage a rent strike 
because of a rent increase (absent rent 
control legislation), they are very 
vulnerable to eviction actions. 
Nevertheless, other tactics, such as 
picketing, might be used to organize 
these tenants, depending on their 
determination and the landlord's 
susceptibility to such tactics. 
2. Substandard, "Tipping" Buildings 
Such a building has housing code 
violations, but is not yet badly 
deteriorated. It is in the process of 
"tipping" from standard housing to 
badly deteriorated housing, a process 
which might go on for several years if 
it is not nipped in the bud. 
Often such a building begins tipping 
because the landlord has either 
decided to "milk" the building or to 
cut back expenses in anticipation of a 
sale. Among the telltale signs that this 
is occurring are the landlord's 
increasing reluctance to act on tenants' 
complaints about needed repairs, a 
poorer job when repairs are finally 
done, and his postponement of 
overhauls on the building's major 
systems (heating, plumbing, etc.). 
These clues should be looked for, 
because a tipping building should be 
one of the less difficult to organize. 
There is legitimate-and legal-cause 
for tenants to be concerned, since the 
landlord is violating the law. At the 
same time, there is some likelihood 
that the landlord is financially able to 
meet their demands. There may be 
several lower-middle or middle income 
tenants in the building who are 
familiar with the benefits of collective 
action (they may be labor union 
members). Also, they may be less 
fearful of an organizing effort, for 
they have the income to secure other 
housing and thus are not too 
dependent on this particular landlord 
(although they may have to be 
persuaded to stay and fight). 
A building might be tipping because 
the neighborhood is tipping, and the 
landlord decides that further 
investment in the building will be 
wasted because soon his more stable 
tenants will leave anyway, vandalism 
will increase, and the building's resale 
value will go down regardless of his 
expenditure on maintenance. This 
reinforces the need for a community-
wide organization which can stimulate 
the organization of tenant unions 
throughout a neighborhood, so that 
these larger, downward trends can be 
halted. 
3. Badly Deteriorated Buildings 
In this type of housing tenants 
usually have many grievances and are 
sometimes angry at the landlord, and 
for that reason are less difficult to 
organize. The problem is that it is 
more difficult for the landlord to 
satisfy meaningful demands. Signifi-
cant repairs are often financially not 
feasible, either for the landlord or for 
a tenant union which might take over 
the building .... Pressure for repairs 
which are too expensive might cause 
the landlord to sell or even abandon 
the building. 
If this limitation is recognized, 
however, the tenants can make certain 
circumscribed demands and be 
organized on that basis. Certain repairs 
can be pressed for, as well as improved 
maintenance and better treatment 
generally. 
C. The Landlord 
One of the crucial factors affecting 
the likelihood of successful organizing 
is the nature of the landlord. This 
includes what type of landlord he is, 
ranging from absentee-professional to 
the owner of a single building who also 
lives in one of the apartments. It 
includes the particular landlord's 
financial position in relation to the 
building, i.e., how much money he is 
making on it. It also includes the 
landlord's personality and attitudes, 
whether he is stable and rational or 
volatile and emotional. 
I. Types of Landlords 
Landlords in slum neighborhoods 
can be divided into three general 
categories, each category reflecting 
differences in financial resources, 
management style, and likely 
responses to tenant organizing. 
a. Absentee-Professional 
The absentee-professional landlord 
may be a wealthy individual, a 
corporation, or a syndicate (a group of 
several investors, often wealthy). This 
landlord owns many buildings, in the 
slum and perhaps also out of the slum. 
Organizing tenants against such a 
landlord may be difficult, but the 
rewards may be worth the effort. 
This landlord has income coming in 
from many buildings, so he has a large 
capacity to resist. A rent strike in only 
a few of his buildings will not make it 
impossible for him to meet his 
mortgage payments. He has the money 
to hire good attorneys and pay them 
to do a thorough job. Also, he often 
has substantial influence on local 
elected officials, city agencies, 
newspapers and other resources 
affecting a tenant organizing drive. 
Perhaps most important, he may have 
had experience with tenants organizing 
and be clever enough to put what he 
has learned to his good ?dvantage. 
Other factors, however, tend to 
increase both the likelihood and 
potential fruits of success. This 
landlord is usually more open to 
rational economic argument (although 
there have been dramatic exceptions). 
If it makes economic sense to sign a 
collective bargaining agreement rather 
than endure a prolonged rent strike, he 
may give in instead of blindly fighting 
the tenants to protect his "principles." 
Because he is more likely to be in the 
public eye, both professionally and 
socially, he may be more vulnerable to 
bad publicity. The ·'slumlord" image 
may hurt his relations with his 
business associates, customers, and 
friends. Where his slum buildings are 
only a small fraction of his holdings, 
he would seem to be particularly 
vulnerable to this approach. 
The attractive aspect of organizing 
against the absentee-professional is 
that he, more than any other landlord, 
has the financial resources to meet the 
tenants demands for repairs. He either 
has the money or has the good credit 
and influence to be able to get it. This 
gives the tenants a goal which is very 
meaningful while still realistic. 
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b. Absentee-"Amateur" 
The absentee-"amateur" landlord 
does not live in the building, but his 
holdings are few, generally one or two 
buildings. 
Because his experience in managing 
property is more limited, he tends to 
be less of a professional businessman 
and less open to rational economic 
persuasion. He may be more likely to 
"stand on his principles" and 
stubbornly resist tenant groups who 
are threatening his "property rights." 
Or, he may become frightened and 
give in to the tenants more readily 
than he has to, fearing a plot involving 
some extreme action. 
These are generalizations, of course, 
but they are more likely to occur with 
this type of landlord than with the 
absentee-professional. 
The absentee-amateur often has 
high mortgage payments and little 
resources with which to combat the 
organizing effort. A short rent strike 
may make it difficult for him to meet 
his payments, and he cannot afford 
many lawsuits if they will involve long 
court battles. 
This lack of resources, however, is 
also the main problem with organizing 
against this landlord. He often has 
neither the money nor the access to 
money for sizeable repairs. Where this 
is the case, the tenant union will 
either have to limit its goals or find 
some way to assist him in procuring 
more money or take over the building 
itself .... 
c. Owner-Occupants 
In most cases, there is little reason 
to organize "against" the owner-
occupant. Because he lives in the 
building himself, he usually does his 
best-within the limits of his 
resources-to properly maintain and 
repair the building. He wants good 
relations with his tenants, since he 
must live with them. The impact of 
this productive attitude on low-income 
housing is a key reason why tenant 
unions should be interested in taking 
control of such buildings, through 
ownership or some other device .... 
The main problem with owner-
occupied buildings is that the landlord 
has very little ability to get the money 
needed for substantial repairs. A 
well-established tenant union, 
however, can work with him to help 
him obtain this money .... 
2. The Landlord's Profit 
In order to assess properly a 
particular landlord's susceptibility to 
tenant organizing and his ability to 
meet their more costly demands, you 
should get some idea of his profit 
picture with regard to the building. 
[Editors note:] 
Analysis of the landlord's financial 
interest should include the following 
elements: (a) Capital investment. 
Prices in slum areas may be inflated 
because low maintenance expense 
allows a large portion of gross rents to 
result in landlord's profit. In states 
where there are usury laws, slum 
properties may be sold for inflated 
prices so that an effective return 
higher than the legal limit can be 
derived from a high risk loan. (b) 
Mortgage terms. Monthly payments 
may be high because only /ow-ratio, 
short-term financing is available. In 
some areas, banks may refuse to make 
mortgage loans a/together. ( c) Sources 
of profit. Rents, depreciation tax 
advantage, and capital gains are all 
important. 
A useful discussion of the financial 
picture of slum landlords can be found 
in The Tenement Landlord by George 
Sternlieb (Rutgers U. Press, 1969) and 
in the completed Tenant Union 
Guide. 
3. The Landlord's Personality 
The personality and attitudes of the 
landlord may be an important factor 
in determining whether his tenants[ 
can be organized and what they can 
obtain. On the one hand, an eccentric, 
somewhat irrational landlord will be 
easier to organize against, since he will 
have done things which have made the 
tenants angry, and he will continue to 
do so. The problem is that his unreliable 
behavior may well continue after the 
tenants' "victory," making it difficult 
to actually obtain the needed repairs 
and a smoother landlord-tenant 
relationship. On the other hand, a 
rational landlord who is carefully 
concerned about his profits may be 
clever enough to resist organizing, but 
if he comes to agreement with the 
tenant union he may be more 
dependable thereafter. 
You may also want to discover and 
take into account the landlord's 
attitudes toward minority groups, 
people on welfare, being considered a 
''slumlord," tenants with children, and 
organizing-will he think the tenant 
union is Communist-inspired? 
D. The Tenants 
The nature of the tenantry in a 
building should be examined to 
determine if they are "good material" 
for organization. 
The number of tenants may have 
some effect on this. Generally a large 
building is better. In a small building 
with perhaps only eight tenants, only 
five or six may be active tenant union 
members, and of these two or three 
may be the mainstays. If one or two of 
these move out (for any of a variety of 
reasons) during the struggle, the 
movement may be decimated. In a 
large building, however, where 30 out 
of 50 tenants may be active, the loss 
of two or three might be absorbed. 
The stability of the tenants is very 
important. If they tend to be 
transient, organizing is very difficult. 
Such tenants have no stake in the 
building and cannot be relied upon. As 
a general rule, large families tend to be 
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The ethnic composition of a 
building might in some cases be 
significant. If it is mixed, there might 
be subtle animosities between the 
races which may come to the surface 
when difficulties arise in the organ-
izing process. 
Finally, the success or failure of an 
organizing effort in many cases will 
turn on how effective the leaders are. 
If a building contains a few intelligent 
well-respected potential leaders who 
get along with each other, a large part 
of the organizing problem is solved 
before you start. If, on the other hand, 
there are no people who meet these 
qualifications, success will be difficult 
to achieve even if the other circum-
stances are favorable. 
E. Small Towns and Rural Areas 
The preceding discussion in this 
chapter is based largely on the 
assumption that poor tenants live in 
multi-unit buildings. This is the case in 
the urban centers on the Eastern 
seaboard and in the Midwest, where 
most tenant union activity to date has 
taken place. However, in small towns 
and rural areas and even in some large 
cities-particularly in the South and 
the Far West-most poor tenants live 
in small single family dwellings. 
Where this is the situation, 
organizing tenant unions is much more 
difficult. Tenants in a 20 unit building 
know each other, face much the same 
problems regarding the condition of 
the building and their individual 
apartments, and are generally dealt 
with by the landlord in pretty much 
the same way. Where tenants live in 
single family dwellings, however, 
these factors tend to be missing. 
Nevertheless, these obstacles can be 
overcome, although it will take more 
effort. Organizers must actively 
contact tenants and bring them 
together. This can be done either by 
grouping together all of the tenants of 
the same landlord or on a street or 
block basis. It is probably best to go 
after the largest and most notorious 
landlord first. If his tenants can be 
successfully organized, then the way 
will be paved for future organizing 
against other landlords. 
Another possible starting point is 
public housing. In many small towns 
and rural areas, the only concentration 
of multi-unit housing for poor people 
is public housing. If organizing begins 
in public housing, a strong group may 
emerge which can later spread into 
private low-income housing in the 
community. 
F. FHA Insured Projects 
The potential for organizing tenants 
may be enhanced when the financing 
of a building has been insured by the 
Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA). There is a greater prospect of 
bringing lawsuits against the landlord 
and even the federal government 
because of this. Because the project is 
publicly assisted and regulated, tenants 
may benefit from constitutional, 
statutory, and regulatory provisions 
not applicable to conventionally 
financed public housing. 
Fourteenth Amendment due 
process protections in admissions and 
evictions have been upheld for FHA 
tenants. Due process arguments are 
also being used as a basis for a suit to 
reform an onerous lease in an FHA 
insured building. FHA regulations and 
the Administrative Procedure Act are 
being invoked in behalf of FHA 
tenants to demand a right to a hearing 
on rent increases before the rent 
increases can be applied. 
V. The Organizing Process 
A. Introduction 
Before beginning, several important 
points should be noted. 
1. Choose Your Goals. 
The organizers must first decide 
what their goals are. Hopefully, their 
primary goal will be recognition of the 
Union by the landlord and his 
agreement to deal with it as represent-
ative of the tenants on a continuing 
basis or to sell the building to the 
Union. In some cases, however, they 
may want or have to settle for 
something less, some short-term 
benefits such as specific repairs or 
cancellation of a rent raise. Whatever 
goals are chosen, they should be 
recognized because they will influence 
what tactics will be most appropriate. 
2. Organize All Buildings. 
Some unions have found that in 
order to successfully force a landlord 
to come to terms, the tenants in most 
or all of his buildings must be 
organized. This is parti'cularly true 
where, for various reasons, the rent 
strike is the only effective weapon 
available. Where only one of several 
buildings is struck, the landlord has a 
steady income from his other buildings 
which gives him time to outlast the 
Union or develop his own tactics 
(including lawsuits) to break down the 
unity of the tenants. 
Some thought might be given to 
organizing on a block basis rather than 
a landlord basis. Organize all buildings 
on the block, regardless of who the 
landlords are. This can help overcome 
the problem of trying to organize and 
effectively rehabilitate one building in 
a run-down neighborhood, where the 
neighborhood is degenerating so 
steadily that it is difficult for one 
isolated building to stay rehabilitated. 
Organizing an entire block can help 
improve the whole neighborhood. 
Also, people on the same block tend 
to know each other and perhaps 
morale can be brought up to the point 
where effective organizing and 
rehabilitation may be possible. 
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Because of the diversity of landlords 
and tenants on an entire block, 
however, the resources necessary to 
organize on a block basis will be much 
larger than those needed to organize 
on a landlord basis. 
3. Management Companies. 
Where the building is operated by a 
professional management company, 
success might be very difficult to 
achieve. The management company 
simply is not't:he "real party in 
interest." All it has to lose is its 
management fee, generally 5% or 10% 
of gross rentals. Since it manages many 
buildings, it can easily afford this loss. 
Therefore, it is difficult to compel a 
management company to sign a 
collective bargaining agreement. It will 
drop its contract with the owner first, 
leaving the union to start all over 
against the real owner. However, some 
experience has shown that the battle 
that then takes place with the real 
owner is not much of a problem. The 
owner has probably used a manage-
ment company in the first place 
because, for one of a number of 
reasons, he does not want to become 
involved in the management of the 
building. Therefore, after he has seen 
how the tenant union has put enough 
pressure on the management company 
to scare it off, he may come to terms 
quite quickly rather than personally 
face a long drawn out struggle with the 
tenant union. 
B. Creating a Receptive Climate 
for Organizing 
Organizers, particularly those 
associated with neighborhood-wide or 
city-wide organizations, can lay a good 
foundation in advance for organizing 
by publicizing slum conditions and the 
names of slumlords in the area and the 
efforts of the organizers to attack 
these problems. The object is to create 
a climate of awareness and interest in 
tenants and potential allies that makes 
the organizing effort easier. When 
organizers enter a building, at least 
some of the tenants will already have 
heard of the organizing effort and will 
more readily trust the organizer. Such 
publicity can take the form of 
newspaper stories, announcements and 
speeches to local churches and other 
community groups, and informal 
contacts with "grass-roots" leaders in 
the community. 
C. Setting Up the Tenant 
Organization 
l. Introduction. 
In setting up a tenant organiza-
tion, the organizers and the lawyer 
have work to do and decisions to 
make. A name must be chosen, a slate 
of officers must be elected, by-laws 
must be drawn up. In this section we 
will discuss the legal form of the 
tenant organization. Should it remain 
an unincorporated association or 
should it incorporate? 
2. Unincorporated Association. 
If the tenant union does not 
incorporate, it will be considered an 
unincorporated association. 
At common law an unincorporated 
association was not a legal entity and 
therefore could not sue or be sued or 
hold property.2 Today, most states 
have changed this by statute,3 thereby 
enabling the group to conduct its 
business through its officers. Be sure 
to check your state's law on this. 
The key problem with not 
incorporating is potential liability of 
the members for acts of the leaders. 
Whether individual members and 
officers of an unincorporated 
association can be held liable for the 
acts of their fellows will hinge on a 
finding of individual participation of 
one sort or another, for the most part 
based on agency theories of express or 
implied consent, authorization, and 
ratification. Generally, each member 
of the association will be fully liable 
on every contract which the officers 
make within their authority, or which 
the member later assents to or ratifies. 
Also, each member is fully liable for 
all torts committed by the association 
within the purposes for which it is 
formed and for torts of employees 
acting within the scope of their 
employment.4 
Certain precautions can be taken to 
cut down on this problem. For 
contracts, the number of persons 
allowed to sign for credit purchases 
can be restricted, and an agreement 
can be made with each creditor that he 
will look only to the assets of the 
tenant union for payment, and not to 
the individual members. For torts, the 
union should make sure that all 
persons who drive an automobile on 
union business have liability insurance. 
If the union maintains an office, it 
should obtain liability insurance for 
accidents which might occur there. 
Insurance cannot be obtained for 
intentional torts, however, so there is 
always the remote possibility of 
liability for individual members (for 
example, if they are sued for engaging 
in an illegal boycott). 
3. Non-Profit Corporation. 
Forming a non-profit corporation 
simplifies these matters. The 
corporation can hold property, make 
contracts, and sue and be sued in its 
own name. The individual members 
are protected from liability. (If the 
corporation has substantial assets, 
however, it is still a good idea to make 
sure these assets are protected by 
adequate liability insurance.) 
The lawyer's task of putting 
together the corporation is not 
difficult. Check your state statutes on 
this, and call your local Corporation 
Commissioner's office for details. 
Generally you must write the Articles 
of Incorporation, which requires only 
general information. Sometimes the 
state supplies forms for these articles. 
Since the corporation is non-profit, 
the filing fee is small, from $5 to $50. 
Some states also require submission of 
a simple annual report or the keeping 
of certain basic records. 
4. Federal Income Tax Considerations. 
It is unlikely that an incorporated 
tenant union will have any taxable 
income. First, its main source of 
funds-membership dues-should be 
considered contributions to capital 
rather than income. Second, other 
income (from cake sales, for example) 
should be spent and thereby offset by 
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Even if the corporation does have 
some taxable. income, it should qualify 
as a tax-exempt organization under· 
Internal Revenue Code Section 501. 
Subsection ( 4) exempts "Civic 
leagues or organizations not organized 
for profit but operated exclusively for 
the promotion of social wel-
fare . . .. " In Garden Homes Co. v. 
Comm., 5 this exemption was allowed 
to a limited dividend corporation 
whose purpose was to furnish at cost 
much-needed homes for working men. 
The tenant union's purpose is similar. 
Also, see several Revenue Rulings 
which allow exemptions under this 
subsection to organizations helping 
low-income people. 6 Although an 
organization may be exempt under 
this subsection while devoting a 
substantial part of its activities to 
influencing legislation, it loses the 
exemption if it backs or opposes 
candidates for public office. 7 
You might also consider applying 
for an exemption under Subsection 
(7), social clubs. Also, if any sizable 
donations to the tenant union are 
expected, you might seek an 
exemption under Subsection (3). This 
will permit the donor to deduct the 
gift as a charitable one, although it will 
also limit the group's ability to engage 
in legislative matters without losing its 
exemption. 
Even though incorporating the 
tenant union may cause no tax 
liability, it will impose the burden of 
filing an income tax return on the 
group, whether or not it has any 
income. 8 
If the tenant union does not 
incorporate, then any income it 
receives is considered income to the 
members, and each member must treat 
a pro rata portion of it as income. 9 
S. Recommendations. 
During the organizing stage, the 
tenant union will own little property 
and make few contracts. The risks of 
liability will be small, and these can be 
further minimized by taking the 
precautions mentioned above under 
Unincorporated Associations. 
Incorporating will require filing tax 
returns and perhaps obtaining an 
exemption, and it might also mean 
complying with state reporting 
requirements for non-profit corpora-
tions. During this stage, the organiza-
tion is simply not set up to handle 
these burdens very easily. 
Hopefully, however, the tenant 
union will become larger and take on 
more responsibility. It may employ 
several people, own automobiles,own 
buildings, and purchase supplies and 
employ contractors. When and if this 
stage is reached, the group should be 
incorporated in order to protect the 
members from liability and to 
facilitate the transaction of business. 
D. Reporting Housing Code 
Violations-Retaliatory Evictions 
At the earliest feasible moment, the 
tenant organization should consider an 
effort to report possible housing code 
violations in the building to the city 
agency responsible for housing code 
enforcement. 
Reporting housing code violations 
can be useful for several purposes. 
First, reporting such violations 
establishes a record that the tenants 
are really concerned about the 
condition of the building so it does 
not appear later-when they are 
publicly struggling with the landlord 
through picketing or a rent strike-that 
they are creating this issue for ulterior 
motives, such as keeping the rent 
money. This can be helpful in gaining 
public support. It can also be 
influential in court, should the 
landlord attempt to enjoin picketing 
or bring eviction actions. 
Second, to the extent that 
reporting results in inspections by city 
housing or building inspectors, it 
builds up a record of actual violations. 
As these inspectors are neutral parties 
in the dispute and· because of their 
expertise in the field, their word 
carries much weight. If state law 
permits partial or complete rent 
abatement where substantial housing 
code violations are present (see 
Section F, Rent Strikes), their 
testimony as to violations will be 
extremely persuasive, if not conclu-
sive. This record of violations might 
also be useful for publicity purposes. 
Third, reporting.will probably 
result in inspection but not in 
correction of the violations by the 
landlord. The city agency might cite 
the landlord and order him to repair, 
but it may grant him extensions, 
compromise on the number of 
violations to be corrected, and, in any 
event, not carry the case to its proper 
remedy, criminal prosecution (which is 
usually not effective anyway, because 
of lax prosecution and light penalties). 
This failure on the part of the city 
agency tends to teach the tenants that 
they cannot rely on the benevolence 
of outside agencies to enforce their 
rights and that they can accomplish 
their aims only through their own 
collective assertion of power. 
There are, however, two serious 
dangers to consider before you decide 
to report code violations. 
First is the possibility that you will 
get too much response from the city 
agency. If the building is in very bad" 
shape, the agency may condemn it, 
order the tenants to vacate and order 
the building demolished. This 
obviously leaves the tenants in a worse 
situation, as well as the landlord. Even 
if demolition is not a serious risk, the 
agency could discover violations which 
the tenants had not noticed and do 
not care about and which cost a good 
deal to correct, such as a foundation 
being too low. If the agency presses 
the landlord to make such a repair, 
this weakens the landlord's 
financial position with regard to the 
building and impairs his ability to 
make the repairs the tenants want. 
Also, if the tenant organization 
contemplated buying the building, it 
will now also have to contemplate 
having the agency's order apply to the 
organization as new owner. 
Therefore, it is wise to try to get 
some sense of what the agency's 
response will be before deciding to 
report code violations. Talk with 
inspectors and even the director of the 
agency about their policies and 
attitudes. There may be ways of 
minimizing these risks, such as 
reporting health problems (e.g., rat 
infestation) only to the city health 
department, which may limit its 
inspections to health problems. 
The second potential danger from 
reporting code violations is that the 
landlord will attempt to retaliate 
against the tenants reporting such 
violations by evicting them. This 
threat can be fought by the collective 
action of the tenants through whatever 
means are most appropriate, such as 
rent strike or picketing. Such 
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retaliatory action against one of their 
members may be just the thing to 
rouse them into action. If such a 
response is premature (the tenants not 
being well enough organized yet), then 
these eviction actions might be 
defended in court under the doctrine 
that eviction for such a purpose is 
contrary to public policy and/or is 
uncontitutional. While not yet firmly 
established, this doctrine is gaining 
wider acceptance by the courts. For a 
description of the current state of the 
law on this doctrine in the various 
states, and some suggestions as to how 
to prove your case, see Moskovitz, 
Retaliatory Evictions-The Law and the 
Facts, Clearinghouse Review, May, 
1969, p. 4, reprinted in Chapter Ill of 
Landlord-Tenant Materials. 
E. Picketing 
Picketing can be one of the key 
weapons in a tenant union's arsenal, 
both for organizing the tenants and for 
putting pressure on the landlord. 
Picketing usually takes place at one 
of three locations. 
First is the building itself. Picketing 
at the building involves no travel time 
or expense, so it is easy to get tenants 
out to picket. Also, it is a very good 
organizational technique, since other 
tenants see the pickets and other 
people in the neighborhood also see 
what is happening. In terms of 
pressure on the landlord, however, the 
benefits are limited. If he is trying to 
sell the building, prospective buyers 
may be deterred by the picket line, 
and in this situation picketing may be 
a good pressure tactic. Another 
variation on picketing at the building 
is to put signs in the windows of the 
tenants' apartments in the build-
ing ... 
The second place to picket is the 
landlord's business, thus bringing 
economic pressure to bear on him by 
persuading his customers to stay away. 
This may be particularly effective 
where the landlord is a rental agent or 
management company. 
The third possible location, 
currently becoming very popular, is 
the landlord's residence. This can be 
especially effective where the landlord 
lives in an all white suburban 
neighborhood and all of the tenants 
are black. 
Be sure to contact all local news 
media, including television stations, 
before picketing. Landlords do not 
like to be identified in newspapers or 
television as slumlords. 
Picketing can involve a very 
complex set of legal problems, which 
you should examine before advising 
any tenant group. These problems are 
discussed in Chapter YI of the 
Landlord-Tenant Materials. 
F. The Rent Strike 
l. Introduction. 
The rent strike is usually the tenant 
union's strongest weapon, as it brings 
direct and immediate economic 
pressure to bear on the landlord. Few 
landlords are able to pay mortgage and 
property tax payments and other 
non-deferrable expenses from sources 
outside rents for long. If a landlord 
cannot "break" the rent strike 
quickly, he must come to the 
bargaining table. 
In this section, we are assuming at 
all times that the building on strike 
contains substantial housing code 
violations. 
2. The Lawyer's Role. 
The attorney has two vital roles to 
play in a rent strike. 
First, he must advise the people as 
to what they can legally do and how 
to do it. The key problem here is that 
in most states, there are neither 
statutes nor cases directly holding that 
a tenant may stay on the premises and 
withhold his rent because of substan-
tial housing code violations .... 
(H] owever, there is a good body of 
precedent from different fields of the 
law which would justify a court in 
making such a holding. In most 
jurisdictions, this issue will have to be 
raised as a "test case." While a lawyer 
may well understand the uncertainty 
this involves, the situation is very 
difficult to communicate to laymen, 
especially those who may be 
poorly-educated and frightened of the 
law, which has usually been used 
against them. At this point, they want 
to be given definite answers, not 
uncertainties. The lawyer is obligated 
to tell the tenants that they might be 
evicted if they withhold rent, but if he 
does so too strongly he may frighten 
them off. The best he can do is to tell 
them that they had better be prepared 
for the possibility of eviction, but 
there is good chance that a court will 
accept their defense and he will do his 
best to persuade it to do so. 
Second, of course, the lawyer must 
be prepared to defend eviction cases if 
they are filed. He must do everything 
he can to prevent any evictions from 
occurring during the strike. If one 
tenant is evicted, morale will probable 
suffer so badly that the strike will end. 
The lawyer should use [all possible 
legal] defenses, ... and also use 
whatever ethical tactics can be used to 
keep the tenants in possession as long 
as possible. 
3. Strategies-Escrow Accounts. 
Since the purpose is to force the 
landlord to bargain by bringing 
maximum economic pressure to bear 
on him, a large degree of tenant 
participation is crucial. As a general 
rule, success will be unlikely unless at 
least one-third of the tenants begin to 
strike at one time. After seeing this, 
other tenants will join in later. This is 
also important as a morale factor, 
since striking tenants who know they 
are a small minority will have less 
courage to go on. 
It is commonly thought that 
tenants on rent strike must pay their 
rent into an "escrow" account, to be 
paid to the landlord if and when he 
brings the building up to code. This is 
not so. Although payment into court 
is required under some statutory 
procedures, such as those in Pennsylva-
nia and New York, if rent withholding 
is permitted under the common law 
arguments presented in the Model 
Points and Authorities, tenants simply 
have no obligation to pay rent. No 
"escrow" is required, the tenants may 
keep the money (although there is a 
remote possibility they could later be 
held liable for some portion of the 
rent on an unjust enrichment theory). 
30 
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(It should be noted that the use of 
the word "escrow" here is a conven-
ient misnomer. "Escrow" means the 
holding of money by an impartial 
third party who has the duty of giving 
it to one of the parties on the 
happening of certain conditions. As 
the tenant organization is not 
impartial, it is not a true "escrow." 
Nevertheless, the term is used and 
should be used, because of the aura of 
legality it gives the strike.) 
Establishing no escrow account 
certainly has its advantages. First of 
all, it will make recruiting easier, since 
the tenants who strike will have that 
much more pocket money. Second, it 
puts more pressure on the landlord, 
for even if he will win his eviction 
suits, he knows that the lost rent 
money will be gone forever (assuming 
the tenants are "judgment-proof") and 
he will lose more as each month goes 
by. Third, it obviates the difficult 
"policing" problems which inevitably 
come up when a tenant organization 
tries to collect the rent, forcing the 
organizers and the leaders to crack 
down on the members. This puts 
strains on the organization. 
Nevertheless, it may be better to 
have the tenants pay their rent into 
escrow. This can impress a court-and 
the public-that the tenants sincerely 
want their building repaired and are 
not just trying to keep their rent 
money. Second, it can create a fund to 
be used for rehabilitation if and when 
the landlord signs an agreement. Third, 
it keeps the tenants in the habit of 
paying rent. If they do not pay rent, 
their spending habits and attitudes 
may change and it may be more 
difficult to get them to begin paying 
rent again after an agreement is signed, 
particularly if repairs cannot be started 
right away. Fourth, the work involved 
in collecting the rent and putting it 
into an escrow account can help keep 
the organization together by giving the 
people something to do together 
instead of just sitting back and 
watching. Finally, the money in 
escrow might be very useful in court. 
Some states allow payment of rent 
after judgment to avoid eviction. If 
you have the money in escrow 
available for this, the tenants can be 
assured that they will not be evicted 
for non-payment. Also, if you lose in 
the trial court and appeal, you will 
want a stay of execution during the 
appeal. To get this, you will probably 
have to put up an appeal bond, and 
you will need the escrow money for 
the bond. 
If an escrow account is set up 
for these reasons, the tenant organiza-
tion must impress on the tenants the 
need to pay rent regularly into the 
account and it must see that the rents 
are paid into it. 
The account may be set up in a 
bank savings account. For with-
drawals, both the signature of the 
tenant organization leader and the 
individual tenant should be required. 
(If the bank will not allow this in one 
large account, use a separate account 
for each tenant.) This has two 
benefits. First, it assures each tenant 
that his money cannot be disposed of 
without his consent, so he feels safer 
in joining the strike. Second, if only 
the leader's signature were required, 
the landlord might sue him to compel 
him to sign the money over to the 
landlord. With the signature of each 
tenant required, however, the leader 
could not comply with such an order. 
The landlord must also sue and serve 
each tenant, which might be very 
difficult. 
The landlord might try to bring a 
suit in equity to grab the money in 
escrow. This was attempted in 
Dorfmann v. Boozer, 38 Law Week 
2004 (D.C. Cir., 1969). Tenants on 
rent strike deposited their rents with 
Credit Union. The rent money could 
be withdrawn by the tenant only on 
his signature and the signatures of two 
of the three Tenants Union officers. 
The landlord sued for an accounting of 
the money, and obtained a preliminary 
injunction compelling the Credit 
Union to pay the money into court for 
disbm:sement to the landlord. The Court 
of Appeals reversed, holding that a suit 
in equity would not lie because the 
landlord's remedy at law was adequate 
and exclusive. He could have used the 
District of Columbia summary 
ejectment and attachment procedures. 
Where attachment of the account is 
seen as a possibility, this may be made 
more difficult by depositing the 
money in a bank in another jurisdic-
tion. 
I. 711 14th St., N. W., Washington, D. C. 2000S, Anthony R. 
Henry, director. 
2. See generally 7 C.J. S., Associations, § § 14, IS. 
3. See, e.g., Calif. Corp. Code § § 21100, 21200. 
4. See 7 C. J. S., Associations, § 32 Ford, Unincorporated Non-
Profit Associations (19S9), p. SO et seq.; Wilmar, Trade Union 
Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, SI Yale 
L. J. 40, 62 (1941); and Comment, Liability of Members and 
Officers of Nonprofit Unincorporated Associations for Contracts 
and Torts, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 812. 
S. 64 F.2d S93 (7th Cir., 1933). 
6. Rev. Rut. SS-439, 19SS-2 CB 2S7; Rev. Rut. 67-294, 1967-2 CB 
193. 
7. Reg. § I.SOI (c)(4)-I (a)(2)(ii). 
8. IRC § § 6012, 6033. A tenant union which does not incorporate 
might also be required to file a return. 
9. It should be noted that in unusual circumstances, an unincorpo-
rated association may be taxed as a corporation, if its characteristics 
resemble those of a corporation. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a). 13
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G. Affirmative Suits 
As has been indicated earlier, the 
attorney should be very careful about 
using affirmative suits against a 
landlord to help the Tenant Union. 
This can weaken the group by 
inducing them to rely too heavily on 
the lawyer and the lawsuit. 
Where the group will not be 
weakened, however, affirmative 
lawsuits against the landlord can be 
very effective in putting pressure upon 
him. For a change, he is on the 
defensive, and psychologically this can 
give quite an effect. He will have to 
put out substantial attorney's fees if 
you use your procedural rights to the 
fullest. If you ask for substantial 
money damages, including punitive 
damages, this will also effect the 
landlord psychologically, regardless of 
the likelihood of recovering such 
damages. Despite his attorney's 
assurances, a layman does not like to 
go to sleep at night with a $100,000 
complaint filed against him. Third, if 
you ask for punitive damages, you are 
entitled to discover the landlord's 
entire financial position, something he 
would probably not be anxious to 
reveal. Also, you can take his 
deposition, for which he will have to 
appear and answer some questions 
which may make him uncomfortable. 
Finally, temporary restraining orders 
and preliminary injunctions may be 
obtained to keep your clients in the 
building while the suit is pending. 
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